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COMMENT 
INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 
THE EFFECT OF TRIBAL WATER 
QUALITY STANDARDS ON 
NON-INDIAN LANDS LOCATED 
BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE 
RESERVATION BOUNDARIES 
L INTRODUCTION 
In City of Albuquerque v. Browner,l the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held, in part, that the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) construction of the 1987 
amendment to the Clean Water Act (CWA) was permissible 
because the amendment is in accord with the doctrine of Indian 
tribal sovereignty. 2 Specifically, the EPA interpreted the 
amendment as allowing tribes to establish more stringent wa-
ter quality standards than those imposed by states or the fed-
eral government.3 In Section 1377 of the CWA, Congress did 
not expressly grant tribes the power to set more stringent wa-
1. 97 F.3d 415 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
2. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (lOth Cir. 1996) (per 
McKay, with whom Henry and the Honorable Jenkins, B., Senior United States 
District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation joined) (Hereinafter 
"Albuquerque 11"). Petition for certiorari denied without comment, City of Albuquerque 
v. Browner, 118 S.Ct. 410 (1997). 
3. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423. 
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ter quality standards. Section 1377 did, however, allow the 
EPA to treat tribes like states.· States have the power to set 
more stringent water quality standards than those created by 
the EPA or by other states pursuant to section 1370 of the 
CW A. 5 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tribes were able 
4. Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1994) provides: 
The Administrator is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a State for 
purposes of Subchapter II of this chapter and sections 1254, 1256, 1313, 1315, 
1318, 1319, 1324, 1329, 1341, 1342, and 1344 of this title to the degree 
necessary to carry out the objectives of the section, but only if -
(1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial 
governmental duties and powers; 
(2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the 
management and protection of water resources which are held by an 
Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a 
member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust 
restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian 
reservation; and 
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the 
Administrator's judgment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in 
a manner consistent with the terms and purposes of this chapter and of 
all applicable regulations. 
Such treatment as a State may include the direct provision of funds reserved 
under subsection (c) of this section to the governing bodies of Indian tribes, 
and the determination of priorities by Indian tribes, where not determined by 
the Administrator in cooperation with the Director of the Indian Health ' 
Service. The Administrator, in cooperation with the Director of the Indian 
Health Service, is authorized to make grants under subchapter II of this 
chapter in an amount not to exceed 100 percent of the cost of the project. Not 
later than 18 months after February 4, 1987, the Administrator shall, in 
consultation with Indian tribes promulgate final regulations which specify 
how Indian tribes shall be treated as States for purposes of this chapter. The 
Administrator shall, in promulgating such regulations, consult affected States 
sharing common water bodies and provide a mechanism for the resolution of 
any unreasonable consequences that may arise as a result of differing water 
quality standards that may be set by States and Indian tribes located on 
common bodies of water. Such mechanism shall provide for explicit 
consideration of relevant factors including, but not limited to, the effects of 
differing water quality permit requirements on upstream and downstream 
discharges, economic impacts, and present and historical uses and quality of 
the waters subject to such standards. Such mechanism should provide for the 
avoidance of such unreasonable consequences in a manner consistent with the 
objective of this chapter. 
5. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994), provides: 
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) 
preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or 
interstate agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting 
discharge of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or 
abatement of pollution; except that if an effiuent limitation, or other 
limitation, effiuent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard 
of performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or political 
subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effiuent 
limitation, or other limitation, effiuent standard, prohibition, pretreatment 
standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent than the effiuent 
limitation, or other limitation, effiuent standard, prohibition, pretreatment 
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to set and enforce their own water quality standards through 
their "residual sovereign powers."6 The Albuquerque court con-
cluded that the powers enumerated in CW A section 1370 are 
already guaranteed to tribes by inherent tribal sovereignty and 
therefore do not need to be expressly incorporated into section 
1377.7 
In Albuquerque v. Browner, the appellate court unani-
mously affmned the district court's holdings, thereby rejecting 
Albuquerque's claim that tribes cannot adopt or enforce water 
quality standards that are more stringent than those set by the 
EPA or approved for the state in which the tribe is located.8 As 
a result, states and cities located upstream from tribes that 
negatively affect the attainment of more stringent tribal water 
quality standards may be required to meet tribal standards 
once approved by the EPA 9 
Part II of this Comment briefly describes the background of 
federal Indian law in the United States, including the jurisdic-
tional disputes between federal, state, and tribal interests. 
Part II also describes the EPA's Indian Policy to further illus-
trate the legal doctrines and policies that help shape current 
judicial opinions. to Part III examines Albuquerque v. Browner, 
in which the Tenth Circuit upheld the EPA's approval of water 
quality standards for the Pueblo of Isleta, an Indian tribe 
whose reservation is located downstream from Albuquerque's 
wastewater treatment plant on the Rio Grande River.11 This 
section illustrates the EPA's proper interpretation of the CWA, 
within the context of inherent tribal sovereignty, and subse-
standards, or standard of performance under this chapter; or (2) be construed 
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States 
with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such States. 
6. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423 n.12 (defining residual sovereign powers as 
those self-governing rights that tribes retain because Congress has not expressly 
eliminated them), citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (holding 
that Indian tribes can use their water rights, which are an element of tribal 
sovereignty, to assert an action against upstream polluters to recover damages for 
groundwater contamination). 
7. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423. 
8. See id. at 423-424, 429. 
9. See id. 
10. See discussion infra part II. 
11. See discussion infra part III. 
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quent EPA regulations that may force upstream polluters to 
comply with a downstream tribe's water quality standards. 
Part IV discusses Albuquerque, the Ninth Circuit's more recent 
decision in Montana v. EPA,12 and the effects of tribal environ-
mental regulation of non-member activities on non-Indian fee 
land located either within or outside Indian reservations. 13 
Montana is the only other appellate court decision addressing 
the issue of EPA authorization empowering Indian tribes to 
establish water quality standards. 14 Part V critiques the 
emerging trend of decisions upholding the EPA's approval and 
enforcement of more stringent tribal water quality standards 
on upstream polluters as well as non-members on fee land 
within a reservation. Part VI concludes that the EPA reasona-
bly interpreted the plain language of the CWA and Supreme 
Court precedent when implementing their regulations to de-
termine when· tribes should be permitted, under Section 
1377(e), to promulgate water quality standards. 15 
II. BACKGROUND OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES IN 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW BETWEEN TRIBES, STATES AND 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Since Europeans first arrived in North America, most legal 
disputes involving American Indian tribes and whites have 
concerned restrictions on tribal sovereignty within America's 
federal system of government.16 The United States Supreme 
12. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). 
13. See Roger H. Bernhardt, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS at 76-80 (1999). 
The term "fee land" is used in a general sense without distinction for land which may 
be held in Fee Tail or Fee Simple, but including the common law rights to possess and 
use the land as the landowner sees fit while also retaining the right to will the land to 
one's heirs. Id. 
14. See Albuquerque II; Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). 
15. See Clean Water Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e). 
16. See e.g. Daniel LS.J. Rey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards 
Dispute: Legal Basis for Tribal Regulatory Autlwrity Over Non-Indian Reservation 
Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 152 (1995-1996) (citing Charles F. Wilkinson, 
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987»; See also DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, 2-7, (3d ed. 1993) (using "sovereignty" to refer to a tribe's right or power to 
self-govern). 
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Court first established the concepts of tribal sovereignty 
through three cases known as the "Marshall Trilogy."!7 
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND TRIBAL 
STATE JURISDICTION DISPUTES 
To justify the United States government's control over In-
dian nations, the U.S. Supreme Court established what many 
Indian legal scholars consider the foundation of American fed-
eral Indian law. IS The "Marshall Trilogy," named after then 
Chief Justice John Marshall, established the legal foundations 
for resolving sovereign jurisdictional disputes between Ameri-
can Indian tribes, states, and the federal government. 19 These 
cases relegated indigenous peoples of the "New World" to the 
status of dependent nation-states to which the United States 
owes a trust responsibility.20 
The first of the Marshall Trilogy cases, Johnson v. 
M'Intosh,2! addressed the authority of Indian "chiefs" to grant 
titles of land in possession of their tribe to non-Indians. 22 The 
Court determined that while Indians retained possessory 
rights over their land, European "discovery" gave the federal 
government the exclusive right to extinguish this Indian title of 
occupancy by purchase or conquest.23 Using this "doctrine of 
discovery," the Court reasoned that European-originated na-
17. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1843); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
18. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4TH ed. 1998). 
19. But see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Court's 
Perpetuation of European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes, 39 FED. B. 
NEWS & J. 6,358-69 (1992), reprinted in GETCHES, supra note 16, at 35-37 (pointing 
out that the colonization of one race of peoples by another inevitably establishes a legal 
system of racial discrimination against the colonized race. Therefore, by citing to the 
"Marshall trilogy" as the basis of federal Indian law, courts and scholars perpetuate a 
racist legacy of using law as a tool of racial domination against indigenous peoples and 
their rights of self-determination). 
20. See GETCHES, supra note 16, at 74 (providing a comprehensive history of 
federal Indian law). See also David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The 
New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF L. REV. 1573 
(December, 1996). 
21. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1843). 
22. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 550. 
23. See id. See also GETCHES, supra note 16. at 69. 
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tions maintained superior rights over lands occupied by "infi-
dels, heathens, and savages," and encouraged white settlers to 
acquire the Indian "waste" lands.24 Thus, Johnson was the fIrst 
decision to engrain into the fabric of American federal Indian 
law the idea that Indian peoples could be denied rights that 
were otherwise provided to the nations of Europe. 25 
In the second case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,26 the Chero-
kees sought an injunction prohibiting Georgia from enforcing 
certain laws upon their reservation lands. 27 The Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the Cherokee Nation constituted a 
foreign, independent, and sovereign nation state, existing sepa-
rate and apart from the United States government.28 The 
Court ruled that Indian nations were not foreign nations but 
rather "domestic dependent nations."29 The Court reasoned 
that although tribes had treaty making powers, they looked to 
the United States government for protection and were there-
fore "completely under the sovereignty and dominion" of the 
federal government.30 Justice Marshall found that the federal 
government had exclusive power over Indian tribes, and analo-
gized the relationship as "a ward to his guardian."3l Thus, the 
Court created the assumption that tribes were dependent on 
the United States government to protect their lands from for-
eign invasion.32 
24. See GETCHES, supra note 16, at 81. 
25. See GETCHES, supra note 16, at 71-72 (stating that Johnson provided a legal 
framework for extinguishing Indian title that was used to acquire the lands of the 
United States). 
26. 30 U.s. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
27. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 2. 
28. See id. at 4, 18. 
29. Id.at17. 
30. Id. 
31. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17. The notion of the federal 
government's relationship to Indian tribes as that of "a ward to his guardian" was later 
expressed as the trust responsibility doctrine. See e.g. United States v. Mitchell 
(Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (stating that statutory duties may render the federal 
government liable to tribes for violation ofthe trust responsibility). 
32. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New 
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1578 n.18 
(December, 1996) (noting that this theory is criticized because many Indian tribes were 
more numerous and powerful than the Europeans during the early days of colonization. 
The author asserts that the major threat to Indian tribes was from European 
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Finally, in Worcester u. Georgia,33 the Court held that a 
tribe's dependent status did not extinguish its preexisting 
tribal powers to govern internal tribal affairs within reserva-
tion boundaries.34 The issue in Worcester was whether the 
State of Georgia's laws could supercede the Cherokee Nations' 
laws to convict a white missionary for residing within the lim-
its of the Cherokee reservation without a license from the State 
of Georgia.35 The Court held that only the federal government 
may infringe upon tribal authority on reservation lands. 36 In 
the Court's analysis, Justice Marshall conceded that Indian 
people were distinct peoples, divided into separate nations, in-
dependent from each other and the rest of the world with their 
own laws.37 Driven primarily by his federalist convictions, Jus-
tice Marshall's decision explicitly established the supremacy of 
federal power over state power in the area of Indian affairs. 38 
Thus, Worcester prevented state infringement on Indian lands 
by strengthening the doctrine of federalism so that it preserves 
tribal sovereignty, subject only to abridgment by the federal 
government.39 
As a result of the Marshall trilogy and other more recent 
cases, federal law generally prohibits states from exercising 
regulatory authority on Indian lands unless Congress has 
encroachment onto their lands. Therefore, protection was needed from colonialism 
rather than foreign military invasion). 
33. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
34. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. The Court noted: "The Cherokee 
nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries 
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the 
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress." [d. 
35. See id. at 531. 
36. See id. at 594. 
37. See id. at 542,543. 
38. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1582 (asserting the triumph of tribal 
government over Indian country was made possible by the presumption that tribal 
sovereignty was only subject to the legislative authority of the United States. Justice 
Marshall found support for this presumption in the Indian Commerce Clause, u.s. 
CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 3, which granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce with 
Indian tribes). See also Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. 
39. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 542-59. 
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authorized such action.40 Nevertheless, the rules established 
by the Marshall cases continue to be criticized by many Indian 
legal scholars as unjustly asserting congressional power over 
Indian affairs based on a self-legitimating colonialist theory.·l 
Despite such criticism, the Marshall trilogy was remarkable for 
its time because it recognized tribal autonomy by significantly 
limiting state powers over Indian lands. 42 
B. MODERN ADJUDICATORY DOCTRINES REGARDING TRmAL-
STATE JURISDICTION DISPUTES 
The Supreme Court's principles for the adjudication of 
tribal-state jurisdictional disputes have fluctuated significantly 
since Chief Justice Marshall's time. 43 For over a century, the 
Court was faithful to the principles set out in the Marshall tril-
ogy and consistently held that, although the United States fed-
eral government can abrogate tribal powers, it can only do so 
through legislation.4• However, the Supreme Court's principles 
for resolving jurisdictional disputes in the twentieth century 
have departed from this precedent and are described by legal 
scholars as the "Modem Era" (1959-1980) and the "Subjective 
Era" (1980-present).45 
40. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221·222 
(1987) (holding that the State of California's regulation of tribal bingo enterprises 
would impermissibly infringe on tribal government). 
41. See generally Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision 
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77 (1993) (discussing the 
continued debate among Indian legal scholars over the morality of federal Indian law 
(or American law as applied to Indians), and its roots in conquest and discovery which 
serve to falsely legitimate congressional plenary power and Congress' ability to alter 
the powers of Indian tribes). But see Getches, supra note 32, at 1581 ("It is too late in 
the day to revisit two centuries of consistently and firmly reiterated precedent or to 
expect a basic reformation of the historical legal relationship of the United States to 
Indian tribes"). 
42. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1581 n.24. 
43. See e.g., Rey.Bear, supra note 16, at 224 n.29 ("On the larger issue of tribal 
status within the United States, Congress has expressed quite varying views of tribal 
sovereignty while the courts have taken an increasingly dim view of it"). 
44. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1630. 
45. See GETCHES, supra note 16. See also Getches, supra note 32, at 1574 n.4. 
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1. The Strengthening of Foundational Principles in the 
"Modern Era" 
During the Modern Era, from 1959-1980, the majority of the 
Supreme Court's decisions reflected the premise established in 
the Marshall trilogy, that state power was prevented from en-
croaching upon tribal sovereignty unless Congress provided 
express permission through legislation.4s In Williams v. Lee,47 
the first case of the Modern Era, a unanimous Supreme Court 
held that state courts had no jurisdiction over a civil claim filed 
by a non-Indian against an Indian for a contract entered into 
on the Navajo reservation.4s In Williams, the Court stated that 
allowing state jurisdiction over such claims would undermine 
the authority of tribal courts over reservation affairs, thereby 
infringing on the right of Indians to govern themselves.49 Thus, 
the Court continued to view reservation boundaries as barriers 
to state regulation absent congressional action to the con-
trary.50 
Another Modern Era case, McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission,51 served to strengthen traditional notions of 
tribal self-government. 52 In McClanahan, the Court held that 
Arizona could not tax an individual Navajo's earned income 
because she had earned it exclusively from reservation 
sources.53 The Court reasoned that, since the Navajo reserva-
tion was established by the federal government for the exclu-
sive use and occupancy of Navajo people, they retained sover-
eignty over their lands, free from the State's intrusion. 54 The 
McClanahan Court was the first to define this approach to In-
dian jurisdiction cases as one of reliance on federal preemp-
46. See Getches, supra note 32, at 163l. 
47. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
48. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (finding that state law was 
permitted only where "essential tribal relations" are not involved). 
49. See id. at 223. 
50. See id. 
51. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
52. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
53. See id. at 18l. 
54. See id. at 174-175. 
9
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tion.55 Under federal preemption analysis, courts focus on the 
federal statutes and treaties at issue while recognizing tr~di­
tional notions of tribal self-government in Indian country. 56 
Thus, preemption analysis under McClanahan favors tribal 
sovereignty unless it is usurped by congressional action. 57 
Williams and McClanahan are just two examples of the Su-
preme Court's decisions during the Modem Era that served to 
uphold the traditional principles found in the Marshall tril-
ogy.58 The Supreme Court's adherence to the traditional prin-
ciple that tribal sovereignty exists subject only to Congres-
sional modification was due primarily to the presence of Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun on the COurt.59 . How-
ever, the current Supreme Court has strayed from traditional 
notions of inherent tribal sovereignty toward a subjective view 
that attempts to balance the interests of Indians and non-
Indians. This approach may subject tribes to state controls 
without Congressional action. 60 
55. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1590 (illustrating that the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine continued to play a central role in McClanahan although demoted to a 
"backdrop" against which the relevant treaties and statutes must be read). 
56. See generally McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164. However, the Court also noted that 
since few federal statutes are clear regarding state jurisdiction, a court must determine 
whether Congress's intent was to pre-empt state jurisdiction by looking at the 
language, legislative history, or circumstances of their enactment. Thus, a court can 
consider the state's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non·Indians on 
reservations. See id. at 17l. 
57. See id. 
58. See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 344 (1983) 
(holding that New Mexico was preempted from regulating hunting and fishing by non-
Indians on trust lands within the reservation because the tribe and federal government 
had extensively regulated these rights). See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 
389 (1976) (granting tribal jurisdiction over child placement proceedings for any child 
who resides on the reservation or is a ward of the tribe). 
59. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1630·163l. 
60. See id. at 1630-1631 (noting that only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Stevens have demonstrated serious interest in Indian cases although neither adheres 
to the traditional view that the judiciary should leave modifications of tribal 
sovereignty to Congress). 
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2. The Degradation of Foundational Principles in the "Sub-
jective Era" 
While the current United States Supreme Court, led by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, has not openly rejected the traditional 
principle that tribal· sovereignty survives until curtailed by 
Congress, the Court has, nonetheless, given great deference to 
non-Indian interests in reservation jurisdictional disputes over 
the past seventeen years.61 Swayed by arguments that effects 
on non-Indians would be severe if tribal sovereignty were up-
held, the Rehnquist Court frequently departs from the tradi-
tional foundations of Indian law.62 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe63 was the first Subjec-
tive Era Supreme Court case to substantially deviate from tra-
ditional principles of. Indian law.64 The· Oliphant Court held 
that tribal authorities lack criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians for crimes committed on reservations.65 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Rehnquist argued that tribal exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants would subject 
them to an unfair system of justice.66 However, the Court ex-
61. See id. at 1574 (citing, in part, Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 
515 U.S. 450 (1995); Department of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 
61 (1994); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994); County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408 (1989); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 
(1988); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Confederated Tribes of Colville 
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, 447 U.S. 134 (1980». 
62. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1594. "The new tendency in the Court's tests, 
rules, and rhetoric is to define tribal powers according to policies, values, and 
assumptions prevalent in non-Indian society." [d. 
63. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
64. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See also Getches, 
supra note 32, 1595-1599. 
65. Oliphant, 435 U.s. at 212. 
66. See id. at 210-211. Two non-Indians were arrested on various criminal 
charges including assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, and reckless driving. The 
Tribe attempted to try the non-Indians in tribal court according to its Law and Order 
Code, which extended tribal jurisdiction over both Indians and Non-Indians. [d. The 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in criminal cases tribes do not have inherent 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Court based its decision, in part, on the fact that 
non-Indians were excluded from Suquamish Tribal court juries, therefore potentially 
infringing on the due process rights of non-Indians. [d. at 194-195. But see Getches, 
supra note 32, at 1597 n.98 (noting that the record in Oliphant did not reflect any 
11
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plicitly stated that its ruling restricted only tribal criminal ju-
risdiction, thereby leaving "untouched the tribes' more impor-
tant civil jurisdiction over non-lndians."67 Oliphant is signifi-
cant because it reflects the Rehnquist Court's willingness to 
protect non-Indian interests over Indian sovereignty.68 
Three years after Oliphant, the Rehnquist Court extended 
its subjective approach to preclude tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians on non-Indian fee land within a reservation. In Mon-
tana v. United States,69 the Supreme Court held that the Crow 
Indian Tribe lacked authority to regulate non-members' hunt-
ing and fishing on non-Indian owned land within the Crow res-
ervation boundaries.70 The Montana Court's denial of tribal 
authority over non-members was based, in part, on the Court's 
subjective view that regulation of non-members' hunting and 
fishing activities on non-Indian lands located within a reserva-
tion did not bear a clear relationship to tribal self-government 
or internal relations. 71 In reaching its decision, the Court cited 
Oliphant for the general proposition that the inherent sover-
eign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to non-members of 
the tribe.72 Nonetheless, the Montana Court created two excep-
tions to its rule. First, a tribe may retain jurisdiction over non-
Indians engaged in consensual relationships through contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements with a tribe or its members. 73 
Second, and most important in the area of environmental 
regulation, a tribe may exercise civil jurisdiction over the con-
duct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the "politi-
cal integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of 
the tribe. "74 Some commentators believe that this second ex-
pattern of discrimination or abuse of the rights of non-Indians by the tribe and that the 
Court's protection of non-Indian interests is not necessary as Congress has plenary 
power over tribes.) 
67. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196 n. 7. See also Getches, supra note 32, at 1598. 
68. See generally Getches, supra note 32, at 1599 (noting that when a case did not 
involve the liberty or property of non-Indians, tribal sovereignty was upheld). 
69. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
70. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-567 (1981). 
71. See id. at 564. 
72. See id. at 565. 
73. See id. at 566-67. 
74. [d. 
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ception leaves the fate of tribal sovereignty up to the subjective 
evaluations of future courts. 75 
While the Rehnquist Court's subjective trend has not totally 
usUrped traditional principles, three themes have emerged. 76 
First, the Court has stepped back from established methods of 
interpreting Indian sovereignty rights. 77 Second, nineteenth-
century policies of assimilation and allotment are sometimes 
cited as justification for limiting Indian autonomy.78 Third, the 
Court has presumed the right of balancing non-Indian interests 
against tribal interests so that tribal sovereignty comports with 
the Court's own idea of what it should include. 79 Nevertheless, 
a return to the bedrock principles of Indian law is occurring 
through congressional legislation authorizing federal agencies 
like the EPA to enact regulations allowing tribes to exercise 
authority over non-member activities that have a serious and 
substantial impact on the health and welfare of the tribe. 80 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE EPA's INDIAN POllCY AND THE CLEAN 
WATER ACT 
The EPA encourages tribal self-determination through both 
the administration of the CW A and its "Indian Policy. "81 These 
two EPA functions foster the expansion of tribal involvement in 
EPA program implementation. This policy empowers tribes 
75. See Getches, supra note 32, at 1610. 
76. See id. at 1620. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. 
79. See id. at 1620·1630. 
80. See generally the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2) (1994); the Clean 
Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1377(e) (1994), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 
42 U.S.C. 30Oj.ll(b)(l) (1994) (provisions providing Treatment as a State (TAS) status 
to qualifying tribes, thereby allowing tribes to make individual fact·based findings 
showing that the activity sought to be regulated would present a serious and 
substantial threat to the health, safety or welfare of the tribe). See also discussion 
infra part II.C. 
8l. See EPA Policy for the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian 
Reservations (November 8, 1984) (Internal EPA Policy Memo on file with author) 
[hereinafter the "Indian Policy"). 
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with as much authority as states to protect the natural re-
sources and the health and welfare of their peoples. 82 
1. The EPA's Indian Policy And Tribal Self-determination 
In November of 1984, the EPA implemented a policy called 
the Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Res-
ervations (hereinafter the "Indian Policy").83 In this policy, the 
EPA states that its fundamental objective is to protect the hu-
man health and environment on Indian reservations.84 The 
policy also emphasizes tribal self-determination and the estab-
lishment of official relationships between federal and tribal 
governments.85 Under the Clinton administration, the EPA 
reaffIrmed the Indian Policy and proposed the creation of a na-
tional Indian Program Office to encourage the expansion of 
tribal involvement in EPA program implementation. 86 
The EPA's Indian Policy contains nine mission statements 
with a brief description of each.87 First, the EPA is ready to 
work with Indian tribal governments on a direct basis, rather 
than as subdivisions of other governments.88 Second, the EPA 
recognizes ''tribal governments as the primary parties for set-
ting standards, making environmental policy decisions, and 
managing programs for reservations, consistent with agency 
82. See e.g. Lynn H. Slade and Walter E. Stern, Environmental Regulations on 
Indian Lands-A Question of Jurisdiction, http://www.lectlaw.com/fileslenv21. 
83. See the Indian Policy. 
84. See id. at 1. 
85. See id. 
86. See e.g. Lynn H. Slade and Walter E. Stern, Environmental Regulations on 
Indian Lands-A Question of Jurisdiction, http://www.lectlaw.com/fileslenv21 (citing 
59 Fed. Reg. 13820 (March 23, 1994) and 59 Fed. Reg. 38460, 38461 (July 28, 1994». 
The authors declare the EPA a strong proponent of tribal environmental regulation 
and predict that, as a result, tribes will develop their own regulatory programs under 
federal environmental statute~ventually obtaining regulatory primacy under these 
federal laws. See id. at 2. 
87. See the Indian Policy at 2-4. 
88. See id. at 2. "EPA recognizes tribal governments as sovereign entities with 
primary authority and responsibility for the reservation populace." Id. Thus, the EPA 
seeks to work directly with tribal governments as the primary authority for reservation 
affairs, rather than as political subdivisions of states or the federal government. See 
id. 
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standards and regulations. "89 Third, the EPA vows to "take 
affirmative steps to encourage and assist tribes in assuming 
regulatory and program management responsibilities for reser-
vation lands. noo Fourth, the EPA will take steps "to remove 
existing legal and procedural impediments to working directly 
and effectively with tribal governments on reservation pro-
grams."91 Fifth, in keeping with the federal trust responsibility 
doctrine, the EPA "will assure that tribal concerns and inter-
ests are considered whenever EPA's actions and/or decisions 
may affect reservation environments. n92 Sixth, the "EPA will 
encourage cooperation between tribal, state, and local govern-
ments to resolve environmental problems of mutual concern. "93 
Seventh, the EPA will work with other federal agencies that 
have similar responsibilities to cooperate in helping tribes as-
sume environmental program responsibilities on reservations. 94 
89. [d. Since the EPA's deliberation policies have usually involved the interests 
and/or participation of state governments, the EPA will look directly to tribal 
governments to play the lead role for matters affecting reservation environments. See 
id. 
90. [d. The EPA pledged to work with interested tribal governments to develop 
programs that help them assume regulatory authority for reservation lands and 
resources. Aid will be made available to qualifYing tribes and may include providing 
grants and other assistance that is similar to those provided to state governments. 
However, until tribal governments are willing to assume full responsibility for 
managing programs, the EPA will retain authority. See id. 
91. [d. The EPA noted that a number of serious constraints and uncertainties 
exist in the language of environmental statutes that inhibit the Agency's ability to 
work directly with tribes. Thus, the EPA pledged to remove these impediments, with 
tribal input, as they are discovered. See id. 
92. The Indian Policy at 3. The EPA recognized the trust responsibility doctrine 
historically derived from the relationships between the federal government and tribes 
as expressed in treaties and federal Indian law. Thus, the EPA endeavors to protect 
the environmental interests of Indian tribes when carrying out its responsibilities 
regarding issues that may affect reservation environments. See id. 
93. [d. The EPA stated that sound environmental planning requires the 
cooperation of neighboring governments, whether they are neighboring states, tribes or 
local governments. Thus, the EPA will encourage early communication and 
cooperation between all interested parties. However, this policy does not lend federal 
support to anyone party to the jeopardy of the interests of the others. Rather, it 
recognizes that, in environmental regulation, problems are often shared and 
cooperation helps·benefit all parties involved. See id. 
94. See id. The EPA seeks to promote cooperation between federal agencies to 
protect human health and the environment on reservations. The EPA will work with 
other agencies to clearly identify and delineate the roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships of the respective organizations to assist tribes to develop and manage 
environmental programs for reservation lands. See id. 
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Eighth, the EPA "will strive to assure compliance with envi-
ronmental statutes and regulations on Indian reservations. "95 
Finally, the EPA will absorb these Indian policy goals into its 
planning and management activities, including its budget, op-
erating guidance, legislative initiatives, management account-
ability and ongoing policy and regulation development proc-
esses.96 
The EPA has adopted these mission statements into its 
planning and management activities since 1984.97 In addition, 
it has used its legal authority to approve tribal water quality 
standards on Indian reservations.98 For example, one EPA 
statement made in support of its decision to approve a tribe's 
water quality standards noted that: "In keeping with the prin-
ciple of Indian self-government, the EPA policy provides that 
tribal governments are the primary parties for setting stan-
dards ... and managing programs for reservations. Moreover, 
federal courts have approved the EPA's decisions to grant In-
dian Tribes the same degree of autonomy to determine the 
quality of their environment as was granted to the StateS."99 
Thus, the EPA refuses to place a limit on tribal water quality 
95. [d. at 4. When facilities owned or man,lged by tribal governments ,_~e not in 
compliance with federal environmental statutes, the EPA }Jkclf,<:" le, ""'.,rk cooperatively 
with tribal leadership to develop means to achieve compliance. 1.\ •. ·:.:ri.hdcss, dir~ct 
EPA action through the judicial or administration process will be considprC"; ":~eT'_' the 
Agency determines, in its judgment, that: "(1) a significant threat to human health or 
the environment exists; (2) such action would reasonably be excepted to achieve 
effective results in a timely manner, and (3) the federal government cannot utilize 
other alternatives to correct the problem in a timely fashion." [d. Yet, when the 
reservation facilities are clearly owned or managed by private parties, the Agency will 
generally respond to noncompliance as it would by the private sector elsewhere in the 
country. See id. 
96. See id. The EPA sought "to ensure that the principles of this policy are 
effectively institutionalized by incorporating them into the Agency's ongoing and long-
term planning and management processes." [d. 
97. See the Indian Policy at 1. 
98. See e.g., Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Staruiards, Are There Any 
Limits?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 367, 381 (1997). 
99. [d. at 378 n.89 (quoting an EPA statement made in support of the Proposed 
Water Quality Standards for the Colville Indian Reservation in the State of 
Washington). See also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (1998). 
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standards, asserting that since states are not limited in their 
strictness of standards, tribes should also not be limited. 100 
2. Treating Tribes as States Under the Clean Water Act 
Congress passed the Clean Water Act (CWA) to "restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters" through the reduction and eventual elimina-
tion of the discharge of pollutants into those waters. 101 While 
the CWA is a federal statute, its implementation involves con-
gressional and executive delegation of enforcement programs to 
the states. 102 To reach its goals, the CW A mandates a partner-
ship between the federal government and the states, giving the 
states "primary responsibilities and rights" to regulate water 
pollution. 103 
Congress provided that the EPA may treat tribes as states 
under the CW A if the EPA promulgates regulations "which 
specify how Indian tribes shall be treated as states," and if the 
Administrator fmds that the tribe fulfills certain specified re-
quirements. 104 First, the CW A requires that the Indian tribe 
have a governing body that carries out substantial duties and 
holds substantial powers. 105 Second, the tribe's proposed ac-
tions must pertain to the management and protection of water 
resources within the tribe's jurisdiction or otherwise within the 
100. See Baker, supra note 98, at 376 n.89 (noting that the EPA claimed that there 
was no sign that Congress intended to treat tribes as "second class" states under the 
CWA). See also 40 C.F.R. § 131 (1998). 
101. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). 
102. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994). This section provides: 
It is the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary 
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate 
pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult 
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter. [d. 
103. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992). 
104. See supra note 4 and accompanying text, CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1377(e)(I) (providing possible TAS status if an Indian Tribes has a governing body 
that carries out substantial governmental duties and powers; functions would pertain 
to the management and protection of water resources held by the Tribe; and the 
Administrator deems the Tribe capable of carrying out the functions proposed). 
105. See id. A governing body with substantial duties and powers may include a 
tribal council that passes legislation and votes on proposals. See also 40 C.F.R. 131.8 
(1998). 
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borders of the reservation. 106 Third, the Administrator must 
regard the tribe as capable of carrying out the functions of all 
applicable regulations consistent with the statute and other 
applicable regulations. 107 
EPA's regulations also set out procedural requirements to 
which Indian tribes must adhere when applying for treatment 
as a state (TAS) status. lOS Tribes must submit a detailed appli-
cation to the EPA Regional Administrator showing that the 
tribe satisfies the prescribed criteria for TAS status. 109 The 
Administrator provides notice of the application to all appro-
priate governmental entities and allows 30 days for the sub-
mission of comments. 110 If public comments challenge a tribe's 
authority, the Regional Administrator determines whether the 
tribe meets the requirements of the CW A. 111 These require-
ments were created to ensure the due process rights of all in-
terested parties. 112 
The implementation of federal environmental statutes in 
Indian country, through TAS provisions, is based on Congres-
sional delegation to the EPA. 113 In turn, the EPA delegates 
significant powers to qualified Indian tribes on a tribe-by-tribe 
basis. 114 Thus, under the CW A, a tribe's water quality stan-
dards could potentially affect the activities of non-members on 
fee lands, both within or outside a reservation's exterior 
boundaries. 115 At least two tribal groups have succeeded in ob-
taining TAS status and have overcome judicial challenges to 
106. CWA 33 U .s.c. § 1377 (e)(2). See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
107. CWA 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (e)(3). See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
108. See generally 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (b)(c) (1998). 
109. See 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (b). 
110. See 40 C.F.R. 131.8 (c)(3). 
111. See 40 C.F.R. 131.8(c)(4). 
112. See generally 40 C.F.R. 131.8. 
113. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
115. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423; See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
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the EPA's authority to empower them to establish water qual-
ity standards. 116 
III. ALBUQUERQUE v. BROWNER: JUDICIAL AP-
PROVAL OF EPA REGULATIONS AND THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF DOWNSTREAM TRIBAL WATER QUALITY 
STANDARDS 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
was the first appellate court to consider the issue of tribal 
authority to set water quality standards.ll7 The court found 
that the EPA's authorization of the Pueblo Tribe to establish 
water quality standards for purposes of the CWA was "in ac-
cord with powers inherent in Indian tribal sovereignty." 118 
Thus, the court upheld EPA enforcement of the Tribe's more 
stringent downstream water quality standards against the City 
of Albuquerque. 119 
A FACTS AND PRoCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Rio Grande River flows from north to south through 
New MexIco, then turns east to form the border between Texas 
and Mexico. 12O The City of Albuquerque, located in New Mex-
ico, discharges treated wastewater eftluent into the Rio 
Grande. 121 This discharge travels five miles downstream to the 
Isleta Pueblo Indian Reservation, which is located on the east-
ern side of the river.l22 Plaintiff, the City of Albuquerque, ac-
quires its water from two wells which draw on an aquifer hav-
116. See generally Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429 (challenging the EPA's approval 
of the Isleta Pueblo's water quality standards). See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 
1142 (constituting a facial challenge to the EPA's regulations authorizing TAS status to 
the qualifying Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes). 
117. See generally City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(hereinafter "Albuquerque Il"). 
118. Id. at 423. 
119. See id. at 424. 
120. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, 736 (D.N.M. 1993) 
(hereinafter "Albuquerque n. 
121. See id. 
122. Id. 
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ing a high arsenic content. l23 Since the aquifer is continually . 
being depleted, the arsenic concentrations in Albuquerque's 
water increase. l24 This increase results in elevated arsenic and 
ammonia concentrations in the wastewater discharged from 
Albuquerque's waste treatment facility into the Rio Grande. 125 
When these elevated levels of pollutants flow downstream, they 
affect the Isleta Pueblo's use of river water for ceremonial use 
and crop irrigation purposes. 126 
Albuquerque's waste treatment facility operates under an 
EPA issued National Pollution Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit. 127 Albuquerque's NPDES permit ensured 
that it met the state of New Mexico's water quality stan-
dards. l28 In an attempt to obtain more control over the Rio 
Grande River's water quality on the reservation, the Isleta 
Pueblo applied for TAS status. On October 12, 1992, after the 
thirty-day comment period, the EPA recognized the Isleta 
Pueblo as a state for purposes of 33 u.s.c. § 1377(e).I29 This 
123. See Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits?, 7 
DUKE ENVI'L. L. & POL'Y F. 367, 381 n.79 (1997) (Janet Baker's personal 
communication with EPA Office of Regional Counsel, Region VI, Dallas, Texas (October 
1996». 
124. See id. at 381 n.114. 
125. See id. 
126. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 428 (describing ceremonial uses to include 
bathing and some possible ingestion of river water). See also http://www.Indianpueblo 
.orglisleta.html. Agriculture is the principle occupation of the Isleta people. Thus, 
water from the Rio Grande River is used for irrigation of food crops. See id. 
127. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 419. 
128. See id. Water Quality requirements under the CWA are implemented through 
a permit process known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES). The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutant, from a point source, into 
the nation's waters except as approved through an NPDES permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(a) (1994) ("except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 
1317,1328,1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person 
shall be unlawful"). Point source polluters are facilities, or specific locations, from 
which water is discharged into any surface or subsurface drainage system. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1362 (14) (1994) defining "Point source" as: 
any discernable, confmed and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to 
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating 
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not 
include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated 
agriculture. 
129. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 419, 426 (noting the City of Albuquerque 
received a fun and fair opportunity for public notice, comment, and hearings under the 
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allowed the Isleta Pueblo to promulgate their own water qual-
ity standards, which the EPA approved in December 1992.130 
The Isleta Pueblo's standard for arsenic in the Rio Grande was 
1,000 times more stringent than the federal Safe Drinking Wa-
ter Standard, and was below the concentration that could accu-
rately be measured by then existing laboratory equipment. 131 
The Pueblo's standards were also more stringent than the 
State of New Mexico's because their designated use of the wa-
ter included primary contact ceremonial and recreational 
uses. 132 While tribal members refused to describe the details of 
ceremonial use, they defined "Primary Contact Ceremonial 
Use" as ~e use of a stream, beach, lake, or impoundment for 
religious or traditional purposes by members of the Pueblo of 
Isleta; such use involves immersion and intentional or inciden-
tal ingestion ofwater."I33 
On January 25, 1993, Albuquerque fIled a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to 
challenge the EPA's approval of the Pueblo of Isleta tribe's wa-
ter quality standards on several grounds. l34 One challenge was 
procedural: Albuquerque asserted that the EPA failed to follow 
the required procedures in approving the tribe's water quality 
standards. l35 Two other challenges were substantive. First, 
Albuquerque asserted that the EPA misinterpreted two provi-
sions of the CW A 136 Second, Albuquerque claimed the EPA 
approved standards that were unconstitutional. 137 
APA and CWA). See supra note 4 and accompanying text for Clean Water Act 33 
U.S.C. § 1377(e). 
130. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 736. 
131. See id. at 742. See infra notes 141·145 and accompanying text. 
132. See Albuquerque 1,865 F. Supp. at 736·740. 
133. Albuquerque /I, 97 F.3d at 428. 
134. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 736. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 736. 
137. See id. 
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1. Albuquerque's Procedural Challenge under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 
Albuquerque's procedural challenge asserted the EPA's de-
cision to approve the Isleta Pueblo's TAS status was "arbitrary 
and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).I38 Albuquerque claimed that the EPA's actions were 
arbitrary and capricious because "compliance with non-
detectable discharge limits would require reverse osmosis [a 
treatment that reduces arsenic levels prior to discharge] with a 
cost to the city of 248 million dollars in capital improvements 
and 26 million dollars in annual operating costs. "i39 Albuquer-
que also alleged, under the AP A, that the EPA should have re-
jected the Pueblo's water quality standards unless an inde-
pendent EPA record found each particular provision sound 
based on a rational basis standard. 140 
The appellate court noted that the CW A permits "the EPA 
and states to force technological advancement to attain higher 
water quality."141 In its analysis, the district court looked to the 
language of the CW A and determined that the EPA only re-
views proposed water quality standards to determine if they 
meet the minimum standards already required by the EPA 142 
The EPA is not authorized to reject proposed standards be-
cause they are more stringent than the minimum federal re-
quirements. l43 Thus, the district court found that although the 
138. Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 737-739 (citing the Administrative Procedure 
Act (5 U.S.C. §706(2)) which requires courts to determine whether the agency action 
under review was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law; ... without observance of procedure required by law; ... or 
unsupported by substantial evidence," and Colorado Health Care Ass'n v. Colorado 
Dept. of Social Services, 842 F.2d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 1991), which noted that the 
arbitrary and capricious standard demands considerable deference to the agency 
decisions and presumes the validity of the agency's action). 
139. Baker, supra note 123, at 381 n.81 (quoting Petition for Certiorari, City of 
Albuquerque v. Browner 20-21 (1997) unpublished court document on me with Janet 
Baker). 
140. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 426. 
141. Id. (citing United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 838 (7th Cir. 
1977)). 
142. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 741 (referring to 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.5; 
131.11(a) (1992)). 
143. See id. (citing 56 Fed.Reg. 64,886 (1991)). 
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Tribe's arsenic standard was strict, the EPA lacked authority 
to reject stringent standards on the grounds of harsh economic 
or social effects. 144 Consequently, both the district and appel-
late court rejected plaintiffs argument that the EPA violated 
the APA by forcing Albuquerque to implement innovative tech-
nology and expensive procedures to clean up its waste water. 145 
2. Albuquerque's Substantive Challenges to the EPA's 
Actions 
In its substantive arguments, Albuquerque claimed that the 
EPA violated the CW A in two ways. 146 First, Albuquerque as-
serted that the EPA failed to create a procedure that resolved 
disputes when a state and Tribe imposed different standards 
on a common body of water. 147 A second, somewhat contradic-
tory argument, was that the EPA had failed to ensure that the 
Pueblo standards were stringent enough to protect the desig-
nated use for drinking water.l48 
The district court rejected Albuquerque's first argument and 
granted summary judgment to the EPA, fmding that the EPA 
had followed the necessary procedures for accepting the 
Pueblo's proposed water quality standards.149 The district court 
found that the EPA's decisions were carefully made, with all 
the relevant factors considered. l50 Albuquerque appealed the 
144. See id. at 741 (citing Homestake Mining Co., v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1283 
(O.S.O. 1979». 
145. See id. at 738. See also Albuquerque II, 97 F .3d at 426. 
146. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 736. 
147. See id. at 740. Albuquerque alleged that EPA's regulations were insufficient 
because they allow only a state or tribe to initiate the resolution process and other 
affected parties should also have this option to initiate the process. Id. Albuquerque 
claimed that limiting this power to invoke violated the APA's requirement that an 
established mechanism for resolving disputes be used when a state and a tribe impose 
different water standards on the same body of water. Id. The Court rejected this 
argument, finding the EPA's regulations were fair because only the tribes and states 
may modifY the water quality standards in question. Id. 
148. See id. (rmding Albuquerque's argument that the Tribe's water quality 
standards were not safe enough under the Safe Drinking Water Act unpersuasive 
because the Tribe's use was not for everyday drinking water). 
149. See id. at 739,742 (rmding that the EPA abided by all the CWA's procedural 
requirements and thereby fulfllied the purposes of the APA). 
150. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 742. See supra note 4 and accompanying 
text for factors. 
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district court's decision, claiming that the CWA does not allow 
tribes to establish water quality standards that are more strin-
gent than federal standards and does not allow tribal stan-
dards to be enforced beyond reservation boundaries. 151 The 
Tenth Circuit disagreed, affirmed the district court's holding, 
and found that the EPA reasonably interpreted the CWA 152 
Albuquerque's second argument, that the Pueblo's water 
quality standards were not strict enough under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), was also unpersuasive to the dis-
trict COurt. l53 Albuquerque claimed that the Pueblo's standards 
were not stringent enough to protect people who came into con-
tact with the water during ceremonial or recreational use. 154 
Because some ceremonial use might involve ingestion of the 
river water, Albuquerque argued that the Safe Drinking Water 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(0, should apply.l55 The district court re-
jected this argument, calling it "far-fetched," because the 
SDW A was intended to protect people who ingest water on a 
daily basis. l56 The court found this statute inapplicable in the 
immediate case because water would only be ingested during 
periodic ceremonial or recreational use. 157 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ANALYSIS WAS ACCURATE AND ITS 
FINDINGS WERE PROPER UNDER THE CWA 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's findings and held that Indian tribes 
may exercise "their inherent sovereign power to impose stan-
dards or limits that are more stringent than those imposed by 
the federal government. "158 In addressing Albuquerque's 
charge that the EPA interpreted the CW A incorrectly, the 
Tenth Circuit approached the case in two ways. 159 First, the 
151. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 421 (referring to 33 U .S.C. § 1377 (1996». 
152. See id. at 429. 
153. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 740. 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See Albuquerque I, 865 F. Supp. at 740. 
158. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423. 
159. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 421-423. 
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court applied the two-step "Chevron test" established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council. l60 The Court created the Chevron 
test to guide judicial review of agency interpretations of acts of 
Congress. 161 The appellate court applied this test to determine 
whether the EPA violated its regulatory authority under the 
CWA 162 The second part of the Albuquerque court's analysis 
focused on the purpose of the CWA as a whole in order to de-
termine whether the EPA had overstepped its authority in 
granting TAS status to the Pueblo Tribe. 163 
The appellate court's analysis relied, in part, on traditional 
notions of federal preemption and inherent tribal sover-
eignty.lM The court found that the Pueblo Tribe was allowed to 
set more stringent water quality standards, "absent an express 
statutory elimination of those powers."l65 The court ultimately 
held that the EPA has authority to require upstream NPDES 
dischargers to comply with stricter downstream tribal stan-
dards; that the EPA's approval of the ceremonial use standard 
in connection with approval of tribal standards did not violate 
the establishment clause; and the tribal standards were not 
unconstitutionally vague. 166 
1. Stricter Tribal Water Quality Standards 
The Tenth Circuit applied the two-step Chevron test to de-
termine whether the EPA's approval of the Pueblo Tribe's more 
stringent water quality standards was permissible. 167 The first 
160. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984). See infra notes 167-182 and accompanying text. 
161. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
162. See Albuquerque Il, 97 F.3d at 422. 
163. See id. at 422-423 (noting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) and Congress's objective in the 
Clean Water Act to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation's waters"). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Congress designed the 
Clean Water Act to provide for a comprehensive regulatory scheme that recognized and 
preserved a primary role to the states in eliminating pollution from the nation's 
waterways. See id. 
164. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423. 
165. Id. 
166. See id. at 429. See infra notes 182, 189-190 and accompanying text. 
167. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 421. 
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part of the Chevron test requires the reviewing court to deter-
mine whether congressional intent is clear and unambiguous 
regarding the specific question at issue. l68 When congressional 
intent is clear, the second part of the test need not be applied. 169 . 
However, if congressional intent is unclear, regarding the spe-
cific issue, courts must apply the second part of the Chevron 
test, which is an analysis of whether the agency's interpreta-
tion is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 170 
Under the first part of the test, the Albuquerque court ex-
amined Congress's intent and questioned whether it was clear 
regarding a Tribe's power to set more stringent standards. 171 
The court found Congress's intent unclear because CW A sec-
tion 1377(e), which authorizes the Administrator to treat quali-
fying Tribes as states, did not expressly incorporate section 
1370, which allows states to· adopt more stringent water qual-
ity standards than other states or the EPA 172 Instead, the 
court reli~d on the EPA's argument that section 1370 is a 
"savings clause that merely recognizes powers already held by 
the states.»l73 Thus, the court found that Indian tribes may 
exercise their inherent sovereign power to establish limits that 
are more stringent than states or the federal government when 
there is no express statutory elimination of those powers. 174 
Since the Albuquerque court did not find express statutory 
limits on these powers, it determined that congressional intent 
168. See Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842·843. 
169. See Albuquerque II. 97 F.3d at 422. 
170. See Chevron. 467 U.S. at 842·843. 
171. See Albuquerque II. 97 F.3d at 422. 
172. See id. at 423. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) specifically includes 33 U.S.C. Sections 
1254. 1256. 1313. 1315. 1318. 1319. 1324. 1329. 1341. 1342. and 1344. The court 
refused to find clear Congressional intent because § 1370 was not expressly listed in § 
1377(e). See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
173. Albuquerque II. 97 F.3d at 423. The COU!t agreed with the EPA's argument 
that 33 U.S.C. § 1370 is a "savings clause" that reiterates rights already held by states. 
For instance. states already have the right to exercise their sovereign power to set 
water standards or limits that are more stringent than those imposed by the federal 
government. Thus. tribes with state status may also exercise these powers. See id. 
174. See id. (citing United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313. 323 (1978) (rmding that 
Indian tribes could use their water rights. which are an element of tribal sovereignty. 
to assert an action against upstream polluters to recover damages for groundwater 
contamination). 
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was ambiguous.175 Thus, the court proceeded to the second part 
of the Chevron Test in its attempt to determine whether the 
EPA had exceeded its authority in interpreting the CW A 176 
In the second part of the Chevron Test, the Albuquerque 
court questioned whether the EPA's approval of the more 
stringent Pueblo standards was based on a permissible con-
struction of the CWA 177 In making its determination, the court 
gave deference to the EPA's interpretation of the CWA because 
the EPA is charged with administering the Act. 178 The court 
rejected Albuquerque's argument that the EPA misinterpreted 
the CWA because section 1377 (empowering the EPA to treat 
tribes as states) does not expressly permit tribes to enforce 
standards under section 1311 (prohibiting the discharge of any 
pollutant) upon upstream, off-reservation, point source pollut-
ers.179 Instead, the court reasoned that because section 1377{e) 
incorporates sections 1341 and 1342 (giving the EPA authority 
to issue NPDES permits in compliance with tribal water qual-
ity standards), the 1987 amendment to the CW A clearly pro-
vides tribes with the authority to establish NPDES permit re-
quirements with the EPA ISO It is the EPA, rather than the 
tribe, that uses the NPDES permit system against upstream 
polluters to enforce the downstream Pueblo tribe's water qual-
ity standards. 181 Consequently, the court found that the EPA's 
construction of the Act {that tribes may promulgate water 
175. See id. at 422. 
176. See id. 
177. See id. 
178. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 422 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 V.S. 91, 
112 (1992), which criticized the Tenth Circuit for failing to give the EPA's 
interpretation of the Clean Water Act "an appropriate level of deferencen ). 
179. See id. at 423. The court found that Albuquerque misconstrued the CWA by 
selectively reading sections rather than the act as a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
180. See id. at 423-424. See also 33 V.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1994), providing in part 
that: 
any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activity ... which 
may result in any discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the 
licensing or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the 
discharge originates or will originate ... that any such discharge will comply 
with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of 
this title. 
181. See id. at 424 (reasoning that since the EPA would be enforcing the Tribe's 
water quality standards, the Tribe did not exceed the scope of its jurisdiction over 
nonmembers by reaching beyond the boundaries of the reservation). 
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quality standards more stringent than those imposed by the 
federal government) was in accordance with the powers of in-
herent Indian tribal sovereignty. 182 
2. EPA's Enforcement of Tribal Water Quality Standards 
Upon Upstream Polluters 
The second question the Tenth Circuit addressed was 
whether section 1377 of the Clean Water Act allowed Indian 
tribes to enforce their standards upon upstream point source 
dischargers outside the reservation boundaries. l83 The court 
held that, under the CW A, tribes are not enforcing their water 
quality standards beyond reservation boundaries. l84 Instead, 
the EPA is exercising its own authority to require upstream 
NPDES discharges to comply with downstream tribal stan-
dards through the NPDES permit system. l85 The court also 
acknowledged that tribes may have jurisdiction 'over non-
Indian conduct that has some direct effect on the health and 
welfare of the tribe. l86 This "health and welfare" theory, first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Montana v. United States, 
asserts that tribes may have inherent jurisdiction over non-
Indian resources if there is "some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe."187 Nevertheless, the court avoided reliance on this less 
utilized "health and welfare" exception by fmding that it was 
the EPA, rather than the tribe, who would enforce more strin-
gent tribal water quality standards upon off-reservation, non-
Indian parties. 188 Albuquerque's constitutional challenges 
182. See id. at 423. 
183. See id. at 423-424. 
184. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 424: 
185. See id. (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112 (1992) (holding that 
the EPA's requirement that NPDES dischargers must comply with the downstream 
State's water quality standards was a reasonable exercise of the agency's statutory 
discretion pursuant to §§ 1341, 1342). 
186. Id. at 424 n.14 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (rmding 
that tribes have inherent jurisdiction over non-Indian conduct or non-Indian resources 
if there is "some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare ofthe tribe"). 
187. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981). 
188. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 424. The court found a stronger basis for the 
Albuquerque decision by relying on Congress's delegation of power to the EPA rather 
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based on First Amendment violations189 and vagueness l90 were 
also defeated by the appellate court. 
than the less utilized Montana exception, apparently because the Montana court 
limited inherent sovereign authority to non-Indian conduct on non-Indian fee lands 
within a reservation when it threatens the political integrity, economic security or 
health or welfare of the tribe. [d. 
189. See id. at 428429. Albuquerque alleged that because the Pueblo's water 
quality standards included "Primary Contact Ceremonial Use" for religious purposes 
by members of the Tribe, the EPA's approval violated the Establishment Clause. The 
First Amendment provides that ·Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion." [d. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. I). The court rejected this 
claim, noting that government action does not violate the Establishment Clause if "the 
challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or 
pnn:;ary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive 
entanglement with religion." [d. (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District, 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993)). 
Albuquerque used the Establishment Clause to challenge the ceremonial use 
standard in three ways. First, Albuquerque claimed that the reason for the designated 
use was explicitly sectarian. The court disagreed and found that the EPA's purpose in 
approving the designated use had a clear secular purpose, namely to promote the goals 
of the Clean Water Act. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 428-429. EPA's approval of the 
Tribe's standards did not violate the Establishment clause because EPA's purpose in 
approving the Tribe's designated use was unrelated to the Pueblo's religious reasons 
for establishing it. [d. Second, Albuquerque argued that the EPA's action had the 
primary effect of advancing the Pueblo's religion because it created and maintained 
conditions that furthered the practice of the religion by requiring sufficient water 
quality standards. The court also rejected this argument, rmding that the primary 
effect of the EPA's action was to advance the goals of the CWA, with any benefits the 
Pueblo received to their religion incidental. In fact, the court stated that: "the agency's 
approval furthers the free exercise of religion, consistent with the policy expressed in 
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act." [d. at 429 n.20. The Act provides that 
"It shall be the policy ofthe United States to protect and preserve for American Indians 
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions 
of the American Indian ... including but not limited to ... freedom to worship through 
ceremonials and traditional rites." [d. at 429 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. 1994)). 
Finally, Albuquerque claimed that the EPA's approval of the designated ceremonial 
use results in excessive governmental entanglement with religion because the tribe 
and the EPA would have to consistently check with each other to see whether the 
standards adequately protected religious use of the river water. The court found 
instead that the EPA's approval of the standard did not require governmental 
involvement in the Pueblo's religious practices because the EPA simply incorporated 
the Pueblo's standards into the issuance of future NPDES permits. Thus, the court 
found that the EPA's purpose in approving the tribe's water quality standards was to 
promote the goals of the CWA and not the Tribe's religion. [d. at 428-429. 
190. See id. at 429. Albuquerque alleged that the Pueblo's water quality standards 
were unconstitutionally vague, thereby depriving them of their due process rights, 
because they were set in narrative terms prohibiting "'floating materials,' 
'contaminants [whichl .. .impart unpalatable flavor of fish,' 'nutrients [whichl produce 
objectionable algal densities,' 'waters [which arel ... virtually free of pathogens.'" [d. 
(quoting Appellant's Br. at 48-49). The court found "a strong presumption that 
29
Leisy: Indian Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
168 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:139 
The Albuquerque court ultimately upheld the EPA's inter-
pretation of the CW A, it's underlying congressional intent, and 
the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty upon which it based 
the decision to grant TAS status to the Isleta Pueblo tribe. 191 
Albuquerque's subsequent petition to the United States Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari was denied without com-
ment. l92 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS IN ALBUQUERQUE v. 
BROWNER IS SOUND AND THE REASONING SHOULD BE 
FOLLOWED BY OTHER COURTS WHEN EVALUATING 
EPA APPROVAL AND ENFORCEMENT OF DOWNSTREAM 
TRIBAL WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 
Because water flows through borders, the ongoing debate in 
this area of law concerns the scope of Indian tribal authority to 
affect non-Indian activities on non-Indian lands located both 
within and upstream from reservation boundaries. l93 This dis-
pute is not about the technical content of approved water qual-
ity standards, but rather involves the power struggle between 
tribes, states, and the federal government to promulgate their 
own water quality standards even if each has significant im-
pacts on the other respective jurisdictions. 
regulations are not unconstitutionally vague if the regulated party has the means of 
obtaining clarification either by making inquiry or through an administrative process." 
Id. (quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982)). The test is 
whether a regulation puts a party on notice as to what conduct is required. Thus, 
Albuquerque's claim of vagueness was without merit since the administrative 
procedure in place gave Albuquerque notice of the specific enforceable standards that it 
must meet. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429. 
191. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429. 
192. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 118 S.·Ct. 410 (November 10, 1997). 
193. See generally Denise D. Fort, State and Tribal Water Quality Standards 
Under the Clean Water Act: A Case Study, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 771 (Fall, 1995). See 
also Daniel l.S.J. Rey·Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute: Legal 
Bases For Regulatory Authority Over Non·Indian Reservation Lands, 20 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 151,217·218 (1995·1996). 
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A THE ALBUQUERQUE COURTS REASONING STRENGTHENED 
TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The Albuquerque court's decision strengthened the notion of 
inherent tribal sovereignty in two ways. First, by adopting the 
EPA's interpretation of the CW A that tribes may set more 
stringent water quality standards under section 1370, the Al-
buquerque court recognized that tribes, like states, retain their 
inherent sovereign powers unless expressly eliminated by Con-
gress. l94 This notion, established in cases like Williams v. Lee, 
protects the authority of Indian governments to regulate their 
reservations. 195 
Second, the Court recognized the Montana v. United States 
public health and welfare exception; that tribes may exercise 
civil jurisdiction over Don-Indian·conduct on fee land within a 
reservation when that conduct has some direct effect on the 
health and welfare of the tribe. The Albuquerque court's rec-
ognition of the validity of the Montana exception offered sup-
port to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Montana v. EPA, 196 where 
it confronted the issue of enforcement of tribal water quality 
standards on non-Indian fee lands within the reservation. l97 
B. THE ALBUQUERQUE COURTS ANALYSIS REGARDING 
INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY WAS CORRECT, As EVIDENCED 
By MONTANA V. EPA 
The Albuquerque court's opinion was recently cited favora,. 
bly by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Montana v. EPA, in which the court upheld the EPA's grant 
of TAS status to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
of the Flathead Reservation}98 Now, two circuit court opinions 
194. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 at 423 (lOth Cir. 1996) 
(hereinafter "Albuquerque II"). 
195. See infra notes 48·50 and accompanying text. 
196. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998). 
197. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998). 
198. See id. The Court noted that: "Our decision is also fully consistent with the 
only other circuit opinion that has yet considered the issue of tribal authority to set 
water quality standards." Id. at 1141. (citing City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 
415 (lOth Cir. 1996». The Ninth Circuit opinion remains good law as the United 
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are in accord regarding the issue of tribal authority to set wa-
ter quality standards}99 Montana v. EPA illustrates the ex-
pansion upon the Albuquerque court's holding that the EPA is 
authorized to treat eligible Indian tribes in the same manner 
as states, thereby allowing the EPA to enforce more stringent 
downstream tribal water quality standards upon upstream 
polluters. 200 
In Montana v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit logically expanded 
the Albuquerque court's reasoning to include the enforcement 
of tribal water quality standards on non-members located on 
fee land within reservation boundaries. 201 If the Ninth Circuit 
in Montana had instead found that tribes possessed inherent 
authority to establish water quality standards for tribal and 
Indian trust lands only, NPDES permits for point source pol-
luters on non-Indian lands within the reservation's watershed 
would still require compliance with downstream tribal water 
quality standards pursuant to Albuquerque, and the United 
States Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas v. Oklahoma:J.02 
Thus, there is little difference between forcing non-Indian, oft'-
. reservation, polluters to comply indirectly with downstream 
tribal water quality standards and forcing non-Indian, reserva-
tion polluters to comply directly with such standards. 203 
At issue in Montana v. EPA was whether the EPA's regula-
tions granting TAS status to the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes on the Flathead Reservation allowed the tribes 
to exceed the permissible scope of their authority over non-
members living within the reservation on fee land.204 The 
States Supreme Court recently denied Montana's writ for certiorari without comment. 
See Montana v. EPA, 119 S. Ct. 275 (October 5, 1998). 
199. Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
200. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 429. 
201. See id. at 423. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1142. 
202. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 106 (holding that Arkansas must 
comply with downstream Oklahoma's water quality standards). See also Albuquerque 
II, 97 F.3d at 423. 
203. See Rey-Bear, supra note 193, at 212. 
204. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138 (claiming that the EPA regulations 
permitting tribes to be treated as states for the purpose of setting their own water 
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Ninth Circuit found that the EPA's regulations were valid and 
reflected the "appropriate delineation and application of inher-
ent tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting non-
members. "205 
1. Facts and Procedural History of Montana v. EPA 
The Flathead Indian Reservation encompasses roughly 1.2 
million acres and contains 4,000 natural stream miles.206 In 
1992, the Tribes were granted TAS status over all surface wa-
ters within the reservation.207 The Flathead Reservation's 
dominant feature is Flathead Lake, which provides water for 
domestic, industrial, and agricultural uses within the reserva-
tion.208 The land within the reservation reflects a checkerboard 
pattern of ownership between tribal and non-tribal entities. 209 
The non-tribal entities include the state, county, and munici-
palities that operate discharge waste facilities into reservation 
waters pursuant to existing NPDES permitS.210 
In their application for TAS status, the Tribes identified 
several facilities located on non-Indian fee lands within the 
reservation that threatened the impairment of the reserva-
tion's water quality.211 Potential point source polluters in-
cluded private and government operated slaughterhouses, hy-
droelectric facilities, wood processing plants, and three waste-
water treatment plants.212 Additional reservation commercial 
activities included feedlots, mine tailings, dumps, landfills, and 
auto wrecking yards. 213 The Tribes submitted a detailed map 
with their TAS application, illustrating that all lands located 
quality standards allowed the tribes to exert authority over non-members that 
exceeded the inherent tribal powers recognized as necessary for tribal self-governance). 
205. [d. at 114l. 
206. See Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. 945, 948 n.5 (D. Mont. 1996). 
207. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 1139. 
211. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139-1140. 
212. See id. at 1140. 
213. See id. 
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within the reservation's boundaries drain into the Tribes' 
Lower Flathead River.214 
The plaintiffs (hereinafter "Montana") included state and 
municipal entities that own fee land on the reservation.215 The 
defendants included the EPA and the Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes.216 Montana opposed the Tribes TAS applica-
tion stating that, if granted, the regulations would permit the 
Tribes to exercise excessive authority over non-members that 
was broader than necessary for tribal self-governance. 217 The 
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants 
and the Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed. 218 
2. The Ninth Circuit Court's Analysis 
The issue in Montana was whether the EPA violated section 
1377(e) of the CWA, which requires the EPA to develop and 
implement regulations that enumerate how Indian tribes shall 
be treated as states for purposes of section 1377(e).219 The EPA 
had determined that the Tribes should be authorized to estab-
lish water quality standards for non-Indian fee lands as well as 
Indian lands within the reservation, based on the EPA's de-
termination that water pollution from non-member activities 
on non-Indian lands would have serious and substantial im-
pacts on the health and welfare of the Tribes.22O Montana ar-
gued that the EPA's regulations permitted the Tribes to exceed 
their inherent tribal sovereignty to impermissibly exercise ju-
risdictional authority over non-members.221 The court held that 
the EPA's regulations providing TAS status to the Tribes was 
valid and reflected the appropriate delineation and application 
214. See Rey-Bear, supra note 193, at 207. 
215. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. 
218. See Montana v. EPA, 941 F. Supp. at 958. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 
at 1142. 
219. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138. 
220. See id. at 1139. 
221. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1138. Petitioners argued that the United 
States Supreme Court's opinion in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), 
prevented tribes from exercising authority over nonmember activities on fee lands 
within the reservation. [d. 
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of inherent tribal regulatory authority over non-consenting 
non-members.222 
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit fIrst looked to the CWA 
and the TAS provisions.223 The court then examined the EPA's 
regulations at issue and found the EPA's third requirement, 
that a tribe's water quality standards program must pertain to 
the ·protection of waters within the reservation, to be of par-
ticular importance because it intended to reflect the scope of a 
tribe's inherent sovereign powers.224 To determine if the Tribes 
could exercise authority over the activities of the non-member 
plaintiffs on non-Indian fee lands, the court relied on the public 
health and welfare exception articulated in Montana v. United 
States, which the EPA adopted into its regulations.225 The 
Montana exception and EPA rules require tribes to show that 
the regulated activity affects "the political integrity, the eco-
nomic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe," and that 
the impact on the tribe is "serious and substantial."226 Under 
the EPA's Final Rules, this determination is made on a case-
by-case basis, based in part on the tribe's scope of inherent 
authority and the EPA's generalized fmdings that water qual-
ity and human health are closely linked. 227 
222. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140·1141. 
223. See id. at 1138·39 (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 1311; 33 U.S.C. § 1342; 33 U.S.C. § 
1377(e». See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
224. Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139 (citing 40 C.F.R. 131.8(a)(1)-(4) (1998». 
EPA regulations require: "(1) the tribe must be federally recognized and exercising 
governmental authority; (2) the tribe must have a governing body carrying out 
'substantial governmental duties and powers'; (3) the water quality standards program 
which the tribe seeks to administer must 'pertain to the management and protection of 
water resources: which are 'within the borders of an lndian reservation'; (4) the Indian 
tribe is reasonably expected to be capable of carrying out the functions of an effective 
water quality standards program in a manner consistent with the terms and purposes 
of the Clean Water Act and regulations"). 
225. See id. at 1139 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981), 
and EPA's Final Rule codified at 56 Fed. Reg. at 64, 877-78». The EPA adopted the 
Montana exception by requiring a Tribe to show that the regulated activities affect "the 
political integrity, economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe," and the 
potential impacts must be ~serious and substantial." Montana, 137 F.3d. at 1139. 
226. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566. See also 40 C.F.R. § 131.8(b)(3). 
227. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1139 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131(b)(3) requiring 
tribes to assert that: (1) there are waters within the reservation used by the tribe, (2) 
the waters and critical habitat are subject to protection under the CW A, and (3) 
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In analyzing the facts of the case, the court first noted the 
general rule established in Montana v. United States that In-
dian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of non-
members on non-Indian land within a reservation, absent ex-
press authorization by federal statute or treaty.22B However, 
the court found the second Montana exception applicable to 
this case, despite some precedent that cast doubt on its viabil-
ity.229 The court cited Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton230 
to support its finding that the powers of inherent tribal sover-
eignty may be invoked by tribes to exercise civil authority over 
non-Indian conduct on fee lands on the reservation when that 
conduct threatens the health and welfare of the tribe. 231 Col-
ville also supported the EPA's generalized findings that, due to 
the mobile nature of contaminates in surface water, it would be 
impracticable to separate the effects of water quality impair-
ment on non-Indian fee land from impairment on tribal por-
tions of reservation land. 232 The court thereby upheld the 
EPA's previous decision, finding that the activities of the non-
members on the Flathead Reservation posed a serious and sub-
stantial threat to the Tribes' health and welfare, thereby re-
quiring tribal regulation.233 
impairment of waters would have a serious and substantial effect on the health and 
welfare of the tribe). 
228. See id. at 1140. 
229. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140-1141. The court noted that while the 
United States Supreme Court disagreed in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), about how to apply the second 
Montana exception, the m~ority nonetheless agreed that it controlled. The Ninth 
Circuit then found that the Court reaffirmed the Montana exception in State v. A-I 
Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1997), which found that the Montana exception 
applies if there is a nexus between the regulated activity and tribal self-governance. 
Id. 
230. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981). 
231. See id. at 1141 (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 
52-54 (9th Cir. 1981). In Colville, the Ninth Circuit held, in part, that the State of 
Washington's potential authority to regulate a watershed located entirely within the 
Colville Reservation was preempted by federal creation of the Reservation, thereby 
leaving regulatory jurisdiction to the tribe and federal government. Montana v. EPA, 
137 F.3d at 1141. 
232. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1141 (citing Colville Confederated Tribes v. 
Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (1981), noting that a water system is a unitary resource so that 
the actions of one user have an immediate and direct effect on other users). 
233. See id. 
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Although the Ninth Circuit noted that the scope of inherent 
tribal authority was a question of law for the courts, not the 
EPA, it nonetheless upheld the EPA's regulations as an appro-
priate interpretation of inherent tribal regulatory authority. 234 
Montana v. EPA reaffIrmed the Albuquerque court's conclusion 
that the EPA reasonably construed and applied the CWA by' 
finding the EPA's regulations were in accord with Congres-
sional intent and inherent tribal sovereignty.235 Although the 
issues were not exactly the same in Albuquerque and Montana, 
the courts used similar legal reasoning in reaching their deci-
sions by looking to the plain language of the CW A and the in-
tent of Congress to fmd that tribes may be treated as states, 
having the ability to set more stringent water quality stan-
dards than the federal government.236 The decisions issued by 
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits were logical and fully consistent 
with each other because they strengthened the purpose and 
intent of the CWA to provide tribal governments with the 
power to exercise authority over "water resources held by the 
tribe, or by members, or over water resources otherwise within 
the borders of an Indian reservation. »237 
v. OTHER COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE DECI-
SIONS SET FORTH IN ALBUQUERQUE v. BROWNER AND 
MONTANA v. EPA BECAUSE TRIBAL WATER QUALITY 
STANDARDS ARE LIKELY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH, 
SAFETY, AND WELFARE OF TRIBES 
As a result of applying ideas of tribal sovereignty to inter-
governmental relationships with tribes, the EPA became the 
first federal agency to recognize and incorporate concepts of 
inherent tribal sovereignty into its regulatory policie~. Specifi-
234. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 1140 (citing Chevron U.s.A. Inc., v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 834-44 (1984), which found that while 
the EPA may not determine the scope of inherent tribal authority, its decision to adopt 
the standard of inherent tribal authority as the standard intended by Congress may be, 
given deference because the CWA's language and legislative history were not entirely 
clear). 
235. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 
Montana v. EPA, at 18 (1999) (unpublished court document on file with author). 
236. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 418-419. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 
1138-1139. 
237. 33 U.s.C. § 1377(e)(2). 
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cally, states with federally recognized tribes may find them-
selves having to abide by EPA-approved standards that are 
more stringent than the state or federal government's stan-
dards. These regulations, which uphold and apply higher lev-
els of water quality standards over jurisdictions sharing a 
common water source, should continue to be upheld because a 
water system is a unitary resource and the actions of one user 
often have an immediate effect on other users. 238 
A A RETURN TO TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF INDIAN LAw 
THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION IN THE CWA 
Traditional principals of federal Indian law begin with a 
broad inquiry into concepts of self-government and existing 
federal policies that promote tribal self-sufficiency.239 Although 
considerations of tribal sovereignty do not control over jurisdic-
tional issues, sovereignty considerations are nonetheless im-
portant because they help protect against state encroachment 
by creating a presumption of federal preemption. 240 
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have logically approved the 
EPA's test that, when considering whether tribes should be 
granted TAB status for purposes of setting water quality stan-
dards for waters that flow through or adjacent to fee lands on a 
reservation, the EPA will look to the facts of the case and 
whether the activities of non-members have "serious and sub-
stantial" effects "on the political integrity, the economic secu-
rity, or the health or welfare of the tribe. "241 In order to com-
port with Supreme Court precedent, the EPA carefully crafted 
its regulations to require that a tribe's inherent authority must 
238. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir. 1981). 
239. See generally Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the 
Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State 
Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581 (1989) (analyzing the delegation of environmental 
program authority to tribes). 
240. See generally David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New 
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1620 
(December, 1996). 
241. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 
Montana v. EPA, at 11 (1999) (quoting Pet. App. 63a) (unpublished court document on 
file with author). 
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be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering whether 
the non-member activities posed a serious and substantial risk 
to the tribe's welfare.242 The EPA found the tribes in Albuquer-
que and Montana faced substantial risks from water pollution 
based on the detailed evidence provided by the tribes in their 
applications. 243 
While these decisions were made on a case-by-case basis, 
tribes are again being viewed by the courts as retaining inher-
ent sovereign authority not otherwise "ceded by treaty, excised 
by federal legislation, or diverted by the courts. "244 The plain 
language of the CWA further strengthens the Albuquerque and 
Montana courts' decisions because it lacks language that di-
minishes tribal regulatory authority. 245 Instead, the CW A re-
flects Congress' intent to authorize the EPA to treat qualified 
tribes in the same manner as states. Section 1377(e)(2) pro-
vides that Indian tribes may receive TAS status not only with 
respect to land held by or on behalf of the tribe or its members, 
but also with respect to land that is otherwise within the bor-
ders of a tribe's "reservation."246 Section 1377(h) dermes the 
term "Federal Indian reservation" as "all land within the limits 
of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government. "247 This definition is analogous to the de-
scription of a reservation as "Indian country," which the Su-
preme Court has consistently held, prior to the enactment of 
section 1377 in 1987, to include "lands held in fee by non-
Indians within reservation boundaries. "246 Thus, the plain lan-
guage of the CWA precludes states like New Mexico and Mon-
242. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. See also Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). 
243. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (1Oth Cir. 1998) (hereinafter 
"Albuquerque II"). See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998). 
244. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes 
possess those parts of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication 
as a necessary result of their dependent status). 
245. See generally CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 et. seq. (1994). 
246. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(2). See also supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
247. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h) (1994). 
248. Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 
Montana v. EPA, at 13 n.3 (1999) (unpublished court document on fIle with author) 
(citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984». 
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tana from arguing that the EPA is barred from treating tribes 
as states with respect to reservation lands owned in fee by non-
Indians. 249 
The reasoning of Albuquerque and Montana should be fol-
lowed by subsequent courts when addressing similar issues. 
Tribes must be able to set requirements on the quality of wa-
ters that enter their reservations from outside sources in order 
to properly regulate the quality of water that flows through 
their lands.250 Similarly, tribes with checkerboard land owner-
ship on their reservations, including Indian trust lands and 
non-Indian fee lands, must also be able to assert full, uniform 
jurisdiction over water quality standards in order to protect the 
health and welfare of the tribe. 251 As previously mentioned, 
this is especially true considering that upstream reservation 
polluters would have to comply with downstream water quality 
standards anyway.252 Thus, if Montana's health and welfare 
exception has any real validity, it must provide for the protec-
tion and promotion of clean water on all reservation lands 
through the regulation of all sources of water pollution. 
B. FUTURE CHALLENGES TO MORE STRINGENT TRIBAL 
WATER QUALITY STANDARDS MUST BE FACT SPECIFIC TO 
SUCCEED 
It is settled law that the EPA's construction of the CWA, re-
garding treating Indian tribes as states, and its subsequent 
agency regulations, are constitutional and in accord with the 
intent of Congress.253 Future challenges to more stringent 
tribal water quality standards must be fact specific to distin-
guish the cases at hand and be successful. In Montana v. EPA, 
the State did not challenge the EPA's factual findings that deg-
249. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
250. See DanielI.S.J. Hey-Bear, The Flathead Water Quality Standards Dispute: 
Legal Basis for Tribal Regulatory Authority Over Non-Indian Reseroatwn Lands, 20 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 151, 213 (1995-1996). 
251. See id. 
252. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 423. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 
91, 101 (1992). 
253. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 415. See also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 
1141. 
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radation of the reservation's waters would have a serious and 
substantial impact on the Tribes.254 Thus, the court reviewed 
only the challenges under the AP A, in which it gave the EPA 
deference. 255 Both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have found the 
EPA's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and the CWA 
reasonable with regard to inherent tribal authority over non-
members in promulgating their own water quality standards. 256 
Future courts should continue to follow this sound precedent. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment focused on the TAS provisions provided by 
the EPA to qualifying tribes under the CWA in the two recent 
circuit court opinions of City of Albuquerque v. Browner and 
Montana v. EPA. While the CWA's TAS provisions may logi-
cally be justified under both federal preemption and sover-
eignty analyses, courts should continue to recognize tribal sov-
ereignty as the determining factor. The argument for inherent 
tribal authority is important because "in every instance where 
tribes, with inherent powers to act, act instead under a delega-
tion of federal authority, the perception of inherent tribal 
authority is diminished. "257 As long as courts continue to use 
non-Indian interests or federal authority as the determining 
factors, sovereignty issues will become even more obscured. 
Because tribes are sovereign entities, non-Indians choosing 
to live or do business on reservations must realize the likeli-
hood of being subject to tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction if 
their activities have a serious and substantial impact on the 
health, safety and welfare of the tribe.258 Although the EPA 
makes a case-specific determination for each tribe, it has also 
made generalized findings that there is a close relationship 
between water quality and the public's health and welfare. 259 
Thus, the EPA should presumptively accept tribal assertions of 
254. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 
Montana v. EPA, at 12 n.l (1999) (unpublished court document on me with author). 
255. See Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 114l. 
256. See Albuquerque II, 97 F.3d at 415; Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d at 114l. 
257. Royster & Fausett, supra note 239, at 597. 
258. See 56 Fed. Reg. at 64,878. 
259. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL., FEDERAL'INDIAN LAw at 625 (4TH ed.1998). 
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the effects on health and welfare unless rebutted by opposing 
parties.260 
Andrea K Leisy * 
260. See id. 
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